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The upcoming 2020 presidential 
election in the Central African Republic 
(CAR) has the potential to derail the 
implementation of the 2019 Khartoum 
Peace Agreement and bring about a 
return to widespread conflict. This calls 
for immediate and collaborative action 
to be taken by those national, regional, 
and international actors working for 
peace in the country. This policy brief 
aims to outline some of the key risks 
posed by the upcoming elections and 
provide recommendations to mitigate 
their potential to negatively impact on 




Since independence, the CAR has been plagued 
by politico-military crises that have weakened 
state institutions, undermined basic social and 
economic structures and created tensions 
between the country's social and religious 
communities. The latest crisis, which erupted in 
December 2012 in the north-eastern region of 
the country and led to the overthrow of long-
standing President François Bozizé in March 
2013, drew the country into an unprecedented 
spiral of violence. Clashes between various 
armed groups set in motion a complex set of 
conflict dynamics, characterised by large-scale 
killings, widespread intercommunal violence, the 
destruction of private and public property, and 
the displacement of roughly a quarter of the 
country’s 4.5 million citizens. 
 
Parallel to the destruction and violence there 
were ongoing efforts to find peaceful solutions. 
The 2015 Bangui National Forum was a major 
step forward in the process. Between 2015 and 
early 2019 several efforts to come to a peace 
agreement failed. But on 6 February 2019, the 
Political Agreement for Peace and 
Reconciliation in the Central African Republic 
(also commonly referred to as the Khartoum 
Agreement) was signed between the government 
and 14 recognised armed groups under the 
African Union (AU) Initiative for Peace and 
Reconciliation in the CAR, which continues to 
be the focus of both national and international 
stakeholders. 
 
While overall levels of conflict have declined, a 
year after its signing there are still regular 
violations of the peace agreement and serious 
incidents of violence and human rights 
violations. In his latest report, UN Secretary-
General Antonio Guterres lamented the 
‘persistent lack of good faith among the 
signatories, in particular the three main ex-
 
 





Séléka armed groups, the Retour, Réclamation et 
Réhabilitation group and Anti-Balaka groups, 
and a nominal commitment by parts of the 
Government, especially the Armed Forces of 
the Central African Republic, as well as sensitive 
matters such as transitional security and justice 
mechanisms, contributed to delays’.i 
 
While the upcoming 2020 presidential elections 
are important to the peaceful resolution of 
conflict in CAR,ii they also have the potential to 
derail the implementation of the 2019 Political 
Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in CAR 
and to negatively impact on the safety and 
security of citizens more generally. The 
combination of an international community that 
wishes to promote rapid democratic elections, to 
be able to deal with a legitimate government, 
and the short-term interests of elites to maintain 
powerful positions can be a security risk. A risk 
that is at odds with long term sustainable 
solutions that require prolonged investments in 





Figure 1 | Battles and incidents of violence 
against citizens in CAR by quarter between 10 
February 2018 and 31 April 2020.iii 
 
As Figure 1 suggests, political tensions relating 
to the upcoming elections may already be 
generating an increase in incidents of violence, 
thus reversing a trend in declining levels of 
violence since the Khartoum Agreement. This is 
at least partly due to the fact that opposition 
leaders and parties are gearing up to face off 
with incumbent President Faustin-Archange 
Touadera. In addition to the tensions related to 
the upcoming presidential and legislative 
elections the COVID-19 pandemic and its 
potential impact on an already dire humanitarian 
situation could lead to further instability. This 
brief will provide an overview of some of the 
current challenges to the implementation of the 
peace deal in CAR and the risks associated with 
the upcoming elections. It will then examine the 
current measures underway to prevent an 
escalation in violence, their weaknesses and 
some potential solutions. 
 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KHARTOUM 
AGREEMENT: KEY SUCCESSES AND 
CHALLENGES TO DATE 
On 9 February 2020, the first anniversary of the 
signing of the Khartoum Agreement was 
commemorated at the presidential palace, with the 
participation of 13 of the 14 signatory armed groups, 
political parties, civil society groups and the 
international community. The United Nations (UN), 
the AU and the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) issued a joint communiqué to 
mark the occasion and call for the full implementation 
of the agreement. To date, several of the agreement’s 
implementation and monitoring mechanisms are 
operational, concerted effort has been applied to 
ensure continued commitment among armed groups, 
and there are increasing efforts to apply more punitive 
measures against violators.  
 
Since the signing of the peace agreement, the CAR 
has seen a modest decrease in violence across the 
country. While armed groups still functionally control 
large swathes of territory, there has been a gradual 
return of state authorities, 16 prefects and 76 sub-
prefects to their posts and the increased deployment 
of civil servants to remote areas. By February 2020, 
the number of police officers and gendarmes 
deployed outside Bangui reached 1,086, police stations 
in volatile neighbourhoods such as PK5 reopened, 
while additional recruitment drives have resulted in an 









Demands for a blanket amnesty made by rebel groups 
at the time of the peace negotiation were rejected by 
the government, and earlier commitments to justice 
made at the 2015 Bangui National Forum were 
reaffirmed in the Khartoum Accord. This aligned with 
demands by CAR citizens that perpetrators of human 
rights abuses be held accountable and refused 
amnesty, as shown in surveys.iv In efforts to address 
impunity and establish the rule of law, CAR’s ordinary 
courts have started to hear cases of abuses by armed 
groups and acts of gender-based violence. For 
example, in February 2020, the Bangui Court of 
Appeal sentenced 28 former Anti-Balaka members 
for their roles in the killings of civilians and 
peacekeepers in Bangassou in May 2017. Their 
sentences ranged from ten years to life imprisonment. 
The Special Criminal Court, established in February 
2019 with the authority to try serious crimes 
committed during the country’s armed conflicts since 
2003, also continues to investigate actively ten 
important cases of human rights abuses.v In addition, 
in December 2018 and January 2019 two CAR rebel 
leaders, Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona and Alfred 
Yekatom, were arrested and handed over to the 
International Criminal Court, where they stand 
accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 
Alongside criminal justice efforts, the signatories of 
the Khartoum Agreement committed to engaging in a 
national process of reconciliation, including the 
establishment of a truth and reconciliation 
commission. To date, a series of public consultations 
have been held and the steering committee has 
handed its report and a bill to establish the 
Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparations and 
Reconciliation (CVJRR) to the president in the 
presence of the opposition, victims’ associations, 
national institutions and international partners. The 
bill was subsequently passed in parliament.vi 
 
The CVJRR is mandated for an initial period of four 
years (renewable) to investigate serious human rights 
violations; look into their causes, circumstances and 
motifs; identify those who are responsible for the 
violence; hear the perpetrators and victims; promote 
forgiveness and create a special fund for victims’ 
reparations. The CVJRR is tasked with short-term 
actions like investigations and justice but also with 
long-term investments in social cohesion and peace 
building.  
 
In addition to national-level efforts, local 
peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives have seen 
some successes in curbing violence, from local 
nonaggression pacts between armed groups to deals 
regarding access to specific areas to community 
violence reduction agreements. In line with the 
recommendations arising out of the 2015 Bangui 
Forum, a network of 38 Local Peace and 
Reconciliation Committees (LPRCs) working across 
seven regions of CAR have also been established with 
the goal of building participatory and inclusive 
dialogues to ensure sustainable reconciliation. As 
called for in the peace agreement, committees for the 
prevention and management of transhumance-related 
conflicts have further been established but are 
currently limited to Ouham and Nana-Grébizi 
Prefectures.  
 
The importance of these local initiatives should not be 
underestimated. As Azou-Passonda et al (2019) argue 
in their study of all 14 CAR peace agreements signed 
in CAR since 2007, these have repeatedly failed 
because they are dominated by elites, favour 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR) as their main mechanism for conflict 
resolution and do not address local drivers of conflict 
and the sense of exclusion experienced at the 
community level.vii Similarly, in UN Secretary-General 
Antonio Guterres’s most recent report, he makes an 
effort to ‘underscore the importance of local-level 
dialogue and reconciliation to prevent and manage 
conflict. Such mechanisms make a tangible difference 
in the lives of many who live together in a community, 
irrespective of ethnicity or religion. I welcome the 
establishment of committees for the prevention and 









The most significant challenge to the implementation 
of the peace deal has been the establishment and 
deployment of the Unités Spéciales Mixtes de 
Sécurité (USMS). These mixed-security units, 
comprising both armed groups and regular 
government forces, were supposed to be operational 
within 60 days of the signing of the Khartoum 
Agreement. However, training, vetting, and funding 
issues, in addition to disagreements around their span 
and area of control, have continued. Three leaders of 
signatory rebel groups were appointed ‘Special Military 
Advisors’. to the prime minister overseeing the USMS 
units in the designated defense zones. However, 
constant pressure on President Touadera not to cede 
control to armed groups meant that the positions 
remained largely without funding or authority.ix Two 
of the three special military advisers – Mahamat al-
Khatim of the Central African Patriotic Movement 
(MPC) and Abbas Sidiki of Return, Reclamation, 
Rehabilitation (3R) – have since resigned. In October 
2019, the northwest unit of the USMS was 
inaugurated in Bouar. However, the operationalisation 
of the northeast and southeast units remained unclear 
as many of the chosen armed groups are in constant 
conflict with each other. In addition, Disarmament, 
Demobilization, Reinsertion and Repatriation 
(DDRR) operations, which include the vetting of 
members for the mixed security units, have also seen a 
number of delays, and the national authorities’ 20 
January 2020 deadline for the conclusion of DDRR 
operations was missed.x 
  
Throughout these processes, several armed groups 
have continued to violate the terms of the agreement, 
including staging attacks on civilians, state 
representatives and humanitarian workers; engaging in 
the illegal taxation of transhumance routes; and 
fighting each other for control of illegal checkpoints, 
mining areas, and to expand their territories. The UN 
Panel of Experts argues there are three main factors 
which account for the discrepancy between the 
statements of armed group leaders in support of the 
peace agreement and their contradictory actions on 
the ground: (1) many armed leaders believe that the 
government has not implemented the agreement in 
good faith, as illustrated by arguments around the 
mixed security units; (2) armed groups are satisfied 
with the status quo, which enables them to continue 
to generate significant revenue, in particular through 
illegal taxation, levying tolls on roads, transhumance 
routes, and trafficking in weapons, gold, and 
diamonds; and (3), some armed groups suffer from a 
structural inability to implement the agreement, such 
as the lack of a defined leadership.xi 
 
RISKS POSED BY THE 2020 ELECTIONS 
In recent months, the political climate has 
become increasingly tense ahead of the 
presidential elections, as parties begin to 
instrumentalise real and perceived government 
failings to gain support. In particular, the return 
of former President François Bozizé and Michel 
Djotodia, the man who led the Séléka to 
overthrow him in 2013, has caused concern. 
Both could likely mobilise armed actors to fight 
on their behalf should they choose. Djotodia 
remains the political head of CAR's main armed 
rebel group, the Popular Front for the Rebirth 
of the Central African Republic (FPRC), which 
maintains control over much of the northeast of 
the country, while Bozizé still has a considerable 
level of support among the army. 
 
While President Touade ́ra’s government remains 
largely unpopular in CAR, the opposition is 
divided, and it remains to be seen how alliances 
between opposition parties and platforms will 
shift and evolve in the build-up to the elections, 
especially in regard to their support of Bozizé, 
Djotodia, and other relevant contenders. In 
2019, an amorphous coalition of civil society 
groups and opposition parties known as Ë 
Zîngo Bîanî emerged to lead public marches in 
Bangui to protest government corruption, poor 
governance and concessions to armed groups 
within the framework of the Khartoum 
Agreement, which the group has publicly 
declared as ‘high treason’. Important political 
 
 





figures such as former head of the National 
Assembly, Karim Meckassoua, who was born in 
PK5 and maintains support among segments of 
CAR’s Muslim community, have come out in 
support of Ë Zîngo Bîanî. 
 
The former ruling Kwa Na Kwa party, which 
supports Bozizé, announced in August 2019 its 
departure from the presidential majority and 
intention to align with opposition political 
parties. In addition, new political opposition 
groups, such as those led by former prime 
minister Anicet-Georges Dologuélé, who was 
beaten by Touadéra in the second round of the 
presidential vote in 2016, have been able to 
point to stalled progress in the implementation 
of the Khartoum Agreement to gain support as 
an opposition party. 
 
The increasingly tense political climate created 
by the upcoming elections poses a number of 
risks to the implementation of the peace 
agreement in CAR and to human security in the 
country more generally: 
 
• As political leaders increasingly prioritise 
mobilising popular support and 
international attention shifts to the 
elections, less focus and support will be 
given to the continued implementation of 
the peace agreement and its various DDRR, 
Security Sector Reform (SSR), and 
Transitional Justice components, 
particularly where these are seen to conflict 
with electoral stability; 
 
• Politicisation of obstacles and challenges 
surrounding preparations of the elections 
and the development of electoral legislation 
could result in provocations and a spike in 
insecurity and political instability. There is a 
risk in this respect if the COVID-19 
pandemic leads to a delay for the elections 
and/or the impossibility to organise them in 
parts of the country. This risk is aggravated 
because parts of CAR are under de facto 
control of rebel groups; 
 
• Currently, more than half of the population 
is in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, 
with some 2.6 million individuals in need of 
food, water, shelter, protection and more. 
Humanitarian needs are constantly 
exacerbated by continued violations of the 
peace agreement by armed groups. The 
availability of funds from donors may 
reduce because of the impact on the 
economic situation of the COVID-19 
pandemic. This reduced funding to address 
the humanitarian situation may lead to more 
tensions; 
 
• Political leaders seeking to consolidate 
support may employ rhetoric which 
undermines social cohesion and touches on 
religious and ethnic fault lines and spark 
widespread or intercommunal violence. As 
Pangburn (2020) succinctly states, ‘Debates 
over who is strongest and most capable to 
lead the country have begun to supersede 
any spirit of accommodation and power-
sharing that informed the signing of the 
peace agreement. Political manoeuvring in 
the capital will likely not help address the 
causes of the rebellion in CAR that have 
historically emerged from the marginalised 
peripheries of the state’; 
 
• The current three-way-battle between 
Touadéra, Bozizé and Djotodia has the 
potential to escalate into full-scale conflict 
should the elections not run smoothly or 
the results be contested. While Bozizé 
remains popular among soldiers, many of 
whom are from his Mgbaya ethnic group, 
Djotodia retains support among some 
factions of the ex-Séléka. In addition, 
 
 





institutional frameworks to settle electoral 
disputes peacefully, such as the national 
electoral commission and the Constitutional 
Court, are weak and lack broad-based 
legitimacy; 
 
• Competition between leaders, particularly 
Bozizé and Touadéra, could also have a 
serious impact on the already strained 
cohesion of the Central African Armed 
Forces (FACA). Bozizé maintains 
considerable support among soldiers. 
Before becoming president in 2003, he was 
a high-ranking military officer and then 
minister of defence under Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa. As mentioned, he is also popular 
among soldiers due to ethnic ties. President 
Touadeéra, on the other hand, is an 
academic turned politician who has found 
difficulty in consolidating support among 
the military since taking power in 2016. 
Adding to these tensions is the fact that 
Djotodia also has support among factions 
of the ex-Séléka, including those who have 
now taken positions in the army. A split 
within FACA, as a result of political 
contestation around the elections, would be 
disastrous for the Khartoum Agreement 
and could itself spark off renewed 
widespread conflict;  
 
• Both Bozizé and Djotodia have been 
implicated in serious human rights 
violations for their roles in the 2013-2015 
violence. Should President Touadéra 
choose to ally with either to consolidate 
support ahead of the elections, this could 
damage the legitimacy of the government 
and impact upon efforts to fight impunity 
in the country, as called for in the peace 
agreement. Should Bozizé or Djotodia take 
power, the implications for the peace 
agreement and its implementation would 
likely be profound; 
 
• Newcomers to Bangui, who have been 
brought into government as part of the 
peace agreement and lack political cachet, 
may resort to violence or other illegal 
means to win votes and/or achieve their 
political objectives. Many of these 
newcomers perceive the government as 
having failed to uphold their side of the 
peace agreement, which may elevate the risk 
of violence;  
 
• and lastly, the elections could provide an 
opportunity for the divergent interests of 
regional neighbours, such as Sudan and 
Chad, and other international powers to 
advance their own political interests 
regardless of whether these are in the best 
interest of CAR or the implementation of 
the peace agreement. 
 
Political uncertainty surrounding the elections 
may slow economic growth and thereby further 
impact on the humanitarian situation and impair 
the government’s already limited service delivery 
capacity. In addition to these risks posed by the 
2020 elections, the CAR must also deal with the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Simply put, if the 
pandemic spreads, it is likely to exacerbate 
almost all of the above risk factors, in addition 
to adding its own. Globally, we have seen how 
the COVID-19 pandemic has not only created 
public health crises in multiple countries but has 
also devastated economies, exacerbated 
humanitarian disaster situations, generated 
increased political tensions, led to the spread of 
dangerous and divisive conspiracy theories and 
disinformation, and increased levels of domestic 
and sexual violence against women and girls, to 
name a few. As of 5 May 2020, the country has 
seen 85 positive cases, ten recoveries and zero 
deaths. In collaboration with the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the government has 
developed a response plan aimed at preventing 
 
 





the spread of the virus and addressing some of 
the national health system’s main weaknesses in 
a more durable way.  
 
SAFEGUARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE KHARTOUM AGREEMENT 
In the coming months, as the approaching 2020 
elections in CAR receive increasing attention 
from both national and international 
stakeholders, it is imperative that the 
implementation of the peace agreement and 
ongoing efforts to build peace and reconciliation 
in the country are kept front of mind. In 
addition, as political leaders negotiate the future 
of the country, efforts must be made to ensure 
ordinary citizens have a voice in these 
discussions. Below are some key 
recommendations to this end: 
 
Functioning grassroots-based and inclusive 
early-warning systems should be developed to 
identify regions and communities where 
electoral violence or other violations of the 
electoral procedures or peace agreement may be 
emerging. All sectors of society should be 
represented in this local mechanism. This should 
not be limited to early warnings but also feed 
into an effective response mechanism that 
determines what kind of intervention is 
necessary, be it, for example, conflict mediation, 
civic education or strategic communications. 
Making an inventory of existing 
initiatives/systems, approaches, effectiveness, 
support/acceptance and coverage is a first step 
to building a nation-wide system that helps to 
prevent and mitigate risks at an early stage. 
Geographic reach is also important, and UN and 
INGOs will have to play a role to ensure that 
efforts reach across the territory of the CAR.  
 
Increased communication and exchange of 
lessons between INGOs and local 
stakeholders, particularly women’s and youth 
groups, but also religious actors, local business 
leaders, and other relevant community 
stakeholders in the build-up to the elections is 
necessary to help identify and respond to 
emerging elections-related challenges and 
conflicts.  
 
Continue and strengthen inclusive donor 
coordination, where necessary, to support 
the electoral process and the 
implementation of the peace agreement. 
International actors and the CAR government 
must continue to coordinate efforts despite the 
restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 
pandemic. All actors should remain part of the 
coordination mechanisms in place. 
 
National and international stakeholders 
must emphasise a message of unity in the 
build-up to the election through strategic 
communications, civic education and campaigns. 
Here, President Touadera will have to use 
rhetoric that promotes compromise, 
collaboration and unity over political 
competition. The AU, as broker of the peace 
agreement, with support from the EU and UN, 
could also play an important role in discouraging 
divisive political rhetoric. 
 
Invest in the candidates who run in the 
elections. With the aid of INGO’s and the UN, 
the government should develop a preparation 
scheme for candidates and a collectively 
undersigned code of conduct for all those who 
run in the elections. The code should stipulate 
ground rules for candidates in the run-up and 
during the elections.  
 
Accommodate debates. The government, 
assisted by the UN and donors, should facilitate 
and accommodate public debates to openly 
discuss different positions, debunk fake news 









Invest in coordination and cooperation. To 
be successful, the constituent components of 
the peace agreement, including SSR, DDRR and 
transitional justice should be linked and work 
together. The same is true for initiatives that 
promote civic education and peaceful elections. 
Improving coordination and cooperation among 
and between international and national 
stakeholders would help to strengthen linkages 
between these processes and guard against 
inefficient resource and capacity allocation. In 
particular, agreement among international actors 
as to the role government ministries should take 
in fulfilling their mandates and leading 
implementation of the peace agreement 
components is needed. Working independently 
of government, based on conviction or past 
experience, may impact upon much needed 
improvements in government capacity. 
 
Focus on national reconciliation. 
Government should prioritise national 
reconciliation as a way of guarding against 
electoral rhetoric that undermines social 
cohesion and touches on religious and ethnic 
fault lines. This national reconciliation should be 
translated in local grassroots activities. 
Significant investment is needed in the 
development of the capacity of the Truth, 
Justice, Reconciliation and Reparations 
Commission to initiate and actively engage in 
local reconciliation activities and fulfil its 
mandate, without which it risks being an empty 
government promise. Moreover, the work of the 
TJRRC should not be isolated and work in 
conjunction with DDRR and SSR initiatives, as 
well as in complementarity with criminal justice 
efforts through the Special Criminal Court and 
the ordinary courts. National and international 
stakeholders should focus on sufficiently 
consolidating the progress of transitional justice 
efforts ahead of the elections, so that they can 
be resilient in the face of changes in political 




Even though the Khartoum Agreement was 
initially received with little enthusiasm by the 
international community, the resilience of the 
political arrangement has proved to be stronger 
than expected. Sure, there have been violations 
and obstacles, but this is also true for any peace 
agreement, anywhere. Today, CAR is confronted 
with a combination of challenges. Some are 
related to the conflict, while others are unrelated 
and totally unforeseen. Without exaggeration, 
one can state that CAR is standing at a 
crossroads. It can go either way. The upcoming 
elections in times of Corona are a necessary but 
delicate step on the road to a new political 
arrangement in CAR, that can turn into a 
positive or a negative gamechanger. Which way 
it will go depends on the concerted actions of all 
of the actors involved, including the AU, 
ECCAS, UN, EU, INGOs and other donors. It 
is imperative that all those involved harmonise 
their approaches and work in solidarity to 
respond to the myriad challenges facing peace 
and reconciliation in CAR. 
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